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Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence (1991 ), edited 
by Peter Fitzpatrick, is the first instalment in a new series, Law and Social Theory, 
being published by the progressive British publisher Pluto Press.1 As someone 
who had been subjected to an intensely positivistic-perhaps even authoritarian­
jurisprudential, undergraduate education in Belfast, both the title and the dustcover 
intrigued me. The latter portrays a towering, seemingly unassailable, citadel with 
"jurisprudence" inscribed upon it, being bombarded by paper planes with the 
insignia of critical theory, semiotics, feminism, postmodernism and "new ideas." 
This image led me to wonder whether the book would signal a counterhegemonic 
breakthrough that would destabilize conventional British legal theoretical wisdom. 2 
The answer, I think, is an unfortunate, but potentially promising, "not yet." 
The book is relatively short (218 pages in all, including a quite useful index) 
comprising only seven essays. As is often the case in jurisprudential collections, 
the essays are of uneven quality. The stronger ones, in my opinion, are those by 
Fitzpatrick, Thomson, Hunt and Smart; the weaker ones are by Sugarman, Goodrich 
and Hachamovitch and Carty. More specifically, several of the essays pay 
insufficient attention to the theme of being a dangerous supplement to conventional 
jurisprudence. Perhaps just a little more editorial prodding would have been in 
order. Furthermore, it is not totally clear as to who the contemplated target market 
might be. Some of the essays appear to be introductions and overviews to certain 
perspectives, thereby suggesting an anticipated student audience, while other 
essays are more like "performances" of particular perspectives thereby suggesting 
an anticipated academic audience. Once again, a little more editorial guidance 
would not have gone amiss. 
1. Forthcoming titles encompass: critical analyses off amily, tort, land, trusts and contract 
law, as well as work on law in the information society, a jurisprudence of race, class and 
gender, and a potentially intriguing Critical Lawyer's Handbook. 
2. I say this in full recognition that some excellent progressive jurisprudential scholarship 
has emerged from Britain in the last decade or so, but also with the awareness that this 
has remained peripheral because of the domination of neo-positivist jurisprudence. 
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It is neither possible nor appropriate to engage in a full discussion with each of 
the contributors to the collection, so in this review I propose to briefly highlight 
the general nature of each of the inquiries and then to interrogate their conception 
of the appropriate ambitions of progressive jurisprudence. More specifically, I 
will argue that although each of the essays goes a long way in "demythifying" 
conventional jurisprudential wisdom on an intellectual level, at the level of the 
politics of legal education, they do not go far enough. The essays fall short in that, 
first, they are too historically retrospective;3 second, their collective embracement 
of at least one strain of postmodemism renders them a tad too cautious; and third, 
they are insufficiently specific in their proposals for reconstruction. Consequently, 
the essays are less dangerous to the traditional canons of jurisprudence (and the 
power elites who perpetuate those canons) than the authors might hope. Thus, the 
dustcover image of paper on basalt may be only too accurate. 
The first essay, by Peter Fitzpatrick, both elaborates on the idea of "dangerous 
supplements" and demonstrates how the technique can work through a 
deconstruction of "the supreme text of jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart's The Concept 
of Law"(p. 2). There is much to be said for Fitzpatrick's critique of Hart, first, 
because it provides a reply to the perennial complaints of noo-positivists and 
liberals that they are not taken seriously by "crits"' and second, because it 
provides an excellent illustration of the incoherence of liberal thought. However, 
although I thoroughly appreciated the actual exercise of desedimentation, I was 
left wondering as to the purpose. The danger with merely supplementing ( even if 
it is critical) is that, in this case, positivism remains centre stage and the critic's 
focus is retrospective to a text that was produced in 1961, even if it is one with a 
pervasive, continuing influence. As a result, Fitzpatrick has little to say about 
alternative interpretive structures and he provides little by way of guidance as to 
how we might proceed once we have witnessed the "self-destruction" (p. 3) of 
The Concept of Law. 
This concern about what Fitzpatrick has to off er in place of Hart goes to some 
of the core thematic issues of the book: what role is the jurisprudential sceptic to 
play in a discipline that is premised upon and demands fidelity? Is the sceptic's 
role simply one of resistance? Should there even be attempts at renewal? The way 
that Fitzpatrick constructs the first two sentences of the book-"Jurisprudence is 
the theorized prejudice of lawyers. Its proponents strive to ensure the viability of 
law and to maintain law's authority" (p. 1)--suggests that jurisprudence and law 
3. I am not suggesting here that legal historical analysis is not valuable, for certainly the 
past can tell us much about where we currently are and how we might proceed. Rather, 
my point is one of emphasis, and I think that in this book insufficient analysis is paid to 
the links between the past, present and future. 
4. See for example Donald Galloway, "Critical Mistakes" in Richard Devlin, ed., Cana­
dian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 255, and 
my reply "Doubting Donald" (forthcoming). 
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are unsalvageable. However, in his conclusion, Fitzpatrick is somewhat more 
guarded, positing that the book's exploration of the "subversive implications of 
excluded knowledges for jurisprudence . . .  is done not just to resist jurisprudence 
as it stands but to provide perspectives in its renewal" (p. 27). The problem with 
Fitzpatrick's own essay, indeed all the essays in the book, is that these strategies 
for renewal are dramatically underdeveloped. The deconstruction of the dominant 
voice without more does little to proactively enhance or make space for the voices 
of the excluded. 
Now there is a good postmodern reason why Fitzpatrick et al. are wary of 
articulating what their proposed visions of renewal might be: to do so runs the risk 
of establishing "an alternative orthodoxy or general truth of law" (p. 30). This is a 
position with which I have much sympathy, for the dangers of creating new 
hierarchies of knowledge and power are pervasive and subtle. But I think that 
Fitzpatrick and his co-contributors get the balance wrong, for critique is not 
enough. Like it or not, law and jurisprudence are deeply entrenched components 
of the social psyche and we need more about how things could be otherwise and 
perhaps a less exclusivist focus on negation. All scholarship is a form of advocacy 
and it seems to me that if those who are progressive wish to persuade their 
audience (student or academic) to be similarly inclined, then it is necessary to 
provide indications of what could be. Modesty and self-restraint are commendable 
jurisprudential qualities, but they are not incompatible with a progressive politics 
of law that delineates reconstructive possibilities mediated by an openness to self­
reflexivity. So, for example, in Fitzpatrick's case it is clear that he is concerned 
about the racist underpinnings and consequences of Hartian jurisprudence (pp. 
16-17). Even a tentative indication of what an anti-racist jurisprudence and legal 
regime might look like may not only be more dangerous but also more persuasive. 5 
Besides, even if conventional liberal jurisprudence a la Hart does implode, even 
if Fitzpatrick is successful in his deconstruction, that does nothing necessarily to 
create space for "excluded knowledges" because the resultant jurisprudential void 
can easily be filled by the voices of the new right, as Thomson's essay on Hayek 
5. One counter argument to my suggestion here is, given that Fitzpatrick is not a member 
of those communities who suffer the negative impact of racist structures, it is neither 
possible nor desirable for him to develop positive anti-racist programmes. Given the 
cultural construction of the "self-Fitzpatrick," for him to articulate the perspective of the 
other would be to assimilate or appropriate that "otherness." This doubt as to "imperial 
scholarship" [Richard Delgado, 'The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of 
CivilRightsLiterature"(l984) 132U.Pa.L.R. at561] is always a real concern, but there 
are possibilities. For example, one could float an idea, fully acknowledging-even 
highlighting-one's own status, that is developed in consultation with "the others," and 
is introduced into the discursive economy contingently and is admitted to be "up for 
grabs." Or, one could acknowledge or refer to proposals developed by "others" as to 




demonstrates. A commitment to resistance uncomplemented by proposals for 
renewal may be a commitment to infinite regression. There is certainly no shortage 
of liberal and conservative pretenders. 
From the first essay in the book, I want to briefly turn to the last two essays, 
because similar concerns surface. The penultimate essay, ''Time Out of Mind: An 
Introduction to the Semiotics of the Common Law" by Peter Goodrich and Yifat 
Hachamovitch analyzes the mythical origins and iconic discourse of the common 
law to highlight the historically contingent and socially constructed nature of 
some of the foundational elements of the common law of privacy, private property 
and liberty. Anthony Carty's "English Constitutional Law from a Postmodern 
Perspective" through a "deconstructive" interpretation of Hobbes, Hooker, 
Blackstone, Burke and Dicey argues that the received traditions of English 
constitutional law are pervaded by repressed contradictions. 
While I learned a significant amount from both essays, I also found them 
frustrating. Both essays are, in a sense, jurisprudential archaeological digs which 
(through the use of different interdisciplinary tools) have unearthed significant 
aspects of the pre- and early history of the English legal tradition that have 
hitherto been buried. But the strongly historical and extremely textual focus of 
both essays leads me to ask, once again, in what way are they "dangerous" to the 
current theories and practices of law? To the extent that they demonstrate the 
contingent, pasted-together and political dimensions of the English legal tradition 
they are destabilizing of the dominant jurisprudential ideologies. But beyond this, 
I am puzzled. In relation to Goodrich �d Hachamovitch' s essay, what is the 
potential contribution of semiotics to a renewed jurisprudence? Are we to transcend 
the semiotics of law, or are we to construct new more progressive and inclusive 
legal symbols? Is there even a role for the subject "we"? In relation to Carty's 
essay, once we recognize through the prism of postmodemism that modem 
positivism is contradictory because it has failed to escape its premodem religious 
influences, what are we to do with this knowledge? Does it suggest ways in which 
our jurisprudence and law can be opened up to the religious diversity of societies 
such as England or Canada? Carty is silent on such issues. Once we unpack the 
unifying impulse that underlies the English constitutional heritage, what does that 
mean for those who want to confer legal and constitutional recognition on their 
differences? Again, Carty is silent on such issues. 
However, Carty does provide some indication as to why he is silent on questions 
such as these. For him, the postmodern mandate is constrained: ''The task of the 
postmodern critic is the easy one of tracing the pre-modem ghosts in cracked 
skeletons of modernity" (p. 198). Indeed, any form of normative reconstruction 
seems to be the furthest thing from Carty's mind for he argues: 
The particular form of poststructuralism upon which I am engaged is simply to 
show, as a matter of historical fact, that the soul has gone out of a culture, that what 
we are studying are fossils, ghosts, dead memories (p. 184). 
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To which I would reply in the concluding words of Carty's own essay: "Why? 
What is the point?" (p. 206). Where and what is the danger? To push this concern 
further, drawing on Thomson's essay, I wonder if Carty's position is all that far 
removed from Hayek's proposition that we should "plan to resist all planning" 
(p. 91). And if we don't plan, are we likely to do anything? In short, Carty's 
position reminds me of the ·arch-deconstructionist, Derrida, and his critique of an 
essay by Walter Benjamin, that it is pervaded by a "terrible ethico-political 
ambiguity."6 
The other essays in the collection provoke somewhat similar concerns, but less 
intensely. David Sugarman's "'A Hatred of Disorder': Legal Science, Liberalism 
and Imperialism" is an attempt to demonstrate how the traditional methodologies 
and parameters of legal thought in England were contingent upon the peculiar 
intellectual and institutional circumstances of the period 1850-1907, and how 
these have had a profoundly constraining impact upon current legal academic 
practice. While the essay ripples with insight, it is unfortunately quite unpolished. 
The introduction is patchy, the core of the essay tends, at times, to be assertive 
rather than persuasive or illustrative in tone, and the references, which took on a 
heightened significance given these other problems, required one to seek out 
another essay published in 1986. The problem was that at least one reference 
which I hoped to pursue-"Pick 1989" (p. 62)--<;ould not be traced. Most of 
these problems stem from the fact that Sugarman's essay is a melange of several 
other pieces he produced in the 1980s. Given the importance of Sugarman' s 
earlier contributions, it is a pity that the synthesis is not smoother for the result 
could have been a very impressive contribution. 
In spite of these criticisms, I found the essay extremely informative. It has 
certainly helped me to have a better understanding of why legal education and 
legal pedagogy, both in Britain and North America, have ended in the lamentable 
state in which they now find themselves. However, once again, Sugarman does 
little to provide guidance as to how we might escape the current predicament. 
Apart from a brief footnote mention to the reconstructive propositions of Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger (p. 65), Sugarman seems to agree with Robert Stevens that: 
despite repeated efforts to break out of its iron cage, legal education was and is 
unlikely to transcend the profession-oriented forces that have controlled most law 
schools most of the time (p. 63). 
The intriguing and more destabilizing questions, however, are why only "most 
schools most of the time"? Why not all schools all of the time? Which schools, in 
which conjunctures and by what means, have managed to deviate? These requests 
should not be understood as the typical reviewer's lament that a better book or 
6. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority" (1990) 




essay could have been written if different questions had been asked. Rather, they 
go to the core of what Sugannan is attempting to deal with, that is, an explanation 
of the hegemony of a cenain politico-intellectual worldview. But hegemony is 
just that, hegemony, and not totality. Yet we are given little indication of why this 
worldview has not been total. If, however, Sugannan had attempted to address 
explicitly these issues, issues that are latent within the analysis that he does 
provide, we would have received a double benefit: not only would we have been 
provided with some inkling of ways to break out of the "iron cage" but also, the 
essay itself would have provided a more cogent explanation as to the nature of the 
contemporary problem. 
An intriguing inclusion in the book is Alan Thomson's ''Taking the Right 
Seriously: The Case of Hayek," which I found to be one of the best written, well 
organized and persuasive contributions. There are, however, two points that I do 
want to address. The first inquires: why should an essay on Hayek, even if it is by 
a leftist, be considered a dangerous supplement? Thomson provides two possible 
answers. The primary response is that Hayek helps us to recognize that 
"jurisprudential 'truths' cannot be divorced from general political and moral 
positions" (p. 94). This is undoubtedly true, but the same can be done with any of 
the mainstream liberal jurisprudes, without committing rare and valuable critically 
dangerous space to the right.7 Thomson's second reason, that Hayek reveals 
"jurisprudence not as a superior, privileged and more profound truth about law, 
but as at best a merely systematic expression of what lawyers have discovered 
works in practice" (p. 95), could also just as easily be made by discussing "and 
thereby enlightening us about" left jurisprudence. 
The reason this curious commibnent of resources disconcerts me relates to a 
more serious comment on Thomson. Thomson, importantly in my opinion, points 
out that "Hayek's vision of life without meaning is becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy" (p. 93). One would have thought that, given Thomson• s concern about 
Hayek's importance, this would generate the response from the progressive 
scholar "What is to be Done?" Swprisingly. this question does not even get asked. 
Having raised the possibility of a Hayekian dystopia, Thomson immediately 
drops it to "revisit" the much less pressing question of why Hayek has been 
ignored by mainstream jurisprudence. 
The reason for this failure to engage is, once again, to be found in the self­
imposed shackles of what might be called "postmodern idealism." Thomson 
wants to avoid rearticulating any "royal road to truth"(p. 95), for he prefers to 
simply "anticipate the 'post' modem" (p. 72). It seems to me that there are real 
problems here because, overcome by vertigo, the best that Thomson can come up 
7. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the left should ignore the right, for undoubtedly that 
would be foolhardy given the current politico-historical context of both Britain and 
North America. Rather, my point is one of contextualism: in the British jurisprudential 
environment, liberalism and neo-positivism are the dominant discourses. 
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with is that jurisprudence should aspire to facilitate a variety of conversations 
based on gender, coloniz:ation, socialism and, it would seem on the basis of this 
essay, even Hayekian liberalism. This, however, ignores the reality that 
conversations are circumscribed and pervaded by power relations, and, in fact, 
ensures the victory of market place ideology, with its inherent logic of 
monopoliz.ation. Conversations cannot be enough for progressives, nor can we 
simply anticipate "the postmodem."Rather, "the postmodern'" must be constructed, 
"indeed struggled for," and the role of a progressive jurisprudence is to make 
tentative and corrigible suggestions as to how, when and where we might proceed 
in the creation of these alternative socio-political and juridical relations and 
structures. Note, however, that this is not simple instrumentalism, nor does it 
require a faith in reason, nor an impulse to universalism, minimal or otherwise. 
Rather, a responsible postmodern jurisprudence can be suggestive of localized, 
particular and strategic interventions that seek to destabilize the power of those 
who have, and to make space for those who have not.9 A good example of what I 
8. One of the more problematic elements of several of the essays in the book is that 
although they espouse "postmodemism." very little is provided in terms of what the 
al,lthors mean by this concept Given that this is a contested concept, such a gap in the 
work leaves the reader unsure as to some of the key elements of the authors' positions. 
Clearly, this is not the occasion to attempt to map out the different themes, components 
and debates within postmodemism. but I want to be clear that mine is not a critique of 
postmodemism per se, rather it is a concern with some variants of it It seems to me that 
one of the great achievements of postmodern analysis is that by highlighting the 
incommensurability of difference it helps us to recognize the inevitability of radical (in 
the Greek sense of "going to the root of') heterogeneity. In so doing in the context of 
law, politics and jurisprudence, it helps to decentre the perspective and normativity of 
whitist. Eurocentric male thought thereby creating space for the articulation of perspec­
tives of those who, traditionally, have been the feared "other": women. people of colour, 
First Nations people, the dispossessed. For elaborations of further discussions of these 
po ints in relation to politics and law, respectively, see Iris Marion Young, Justice and 
the Politics of Difference (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1990); Martha 
Minow, Making All the Difference (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
9. It is obvious that I am still operating on the assumption that there is a role for "human 
agency" and some might object that this is premised on a humanistic/modernist 
conception of. the self that is incompatible with postmodern conceptions of the 
fundamentally contingent self. It seems to me, however, that to recognize anti­
essentialism and the relational self does not lead to an eradication or annihilation of the 
self, but rather that it is simply reconstituted to whatSeyla Benhabib (following Adorno) 
calls a "situated self' [''Critical Theory and Postmodernism: On the Interplay of Ethics, 
Aesthetics and Utopia in Critical Theory" (1990) 11 Cardozo L.R. 1435 at 1445]. 
Because this situated self is located in the interaction of the multitude of relations, there 
are endless opportunities for such a self to participate . . .  though there is no guarantee 
that its actions will be uncontroversial or effective. Those questions will depend upon 




am suggesting here is to be found in Gerry Frog's "The Ideology of American 
Law"10 which also adopts the idea of dangerous supplements but takes it much 
further so as to suggest alternatives to the power relations that pervade contemporary 
corporate and administrative structures. 
Alan Hunt's essay, "Marxism, Law, Legal Theory and Jurisprudence" caused 
me less concern than some of the others, possibly because it is closer to my own 
heart. It is a well written, nicely structured overview of some of the key themes of 
marxist jurisprudence and is about as accessible as you can get in a jurisprudential 
regime dominated by liberal legalism. Moreover, Hunt is quite persuasive in his 
argument that a relational theory of law is explanatorily superior to other marxist 
approaches, and he deals succinctly with the issues of the relationship between 
law and ideology, law and state, economic relations and law, and law and class. 
Less persuasive, however, is his discussion of the relationship between marxism 
and gender, but this is hardly surprising given the complexity of the issue. 
Hunt appears to be somewhat less smitten with the postmodern bug than all of 
the other contributors to the book. Though he is clear that marxist legal theory 
should play an "oppositional role" (p. 103) he also indicates that a more positive 
posture should be developed. For example, when he critiques commodity form 
theory, he rejects the idea of the "withering away of law" and suggests the need 
for socialist laws. Furthermore, at the end of the essay he points out that one of the 
problems with the regimes of the now defunct eastern bloc was that they lacked 
"democratic law." The problem is that Hunt provides little in the way of concrete 
analyses of what "socialist" or "democratic" laws might mean, but at least there 
appears to be something of the promised renewal. Nor would this have required 
another essay. Hunt has written several other articles on the role of rights discourse 
and brief illustrations from these could quite easily have been used to provide 
suggestions as to how we might proceed.11 In this way, he could have taken us one 
step beyond vague aspirationalism to provide not just a supplement but the 
tentative outline of an alternative jurisprudential vision. 
Carol Smart's essay, "Feminist Jurisprudence" also provides indications of 
reconstructive energy, guarded though they may be. The essay is an historical 
self is in relation with other selves-i.e., that it is in part constituted by and itself constitutes 
such other selves-that one has responsibilities to them. In other words, because of its 
interdependence with others the situated self has a responsibility to engage. 
10. (1984) 97 Harvard L. R. at 1277. 
1 1. This is not to be interpreted as suggesting that I think that "rights discourse" is the 
appropriate way to go. Rights discourse itself can be deconstructed to highlight its 
ethnocentric bias, as Mary Ellen Turpel has demonstrated in her "Aboriginal Peoples 
and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" in Richard 
Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (f oronto: Emond Montgomery, 
1991) at 503. My point is that at least Hunt is making some suggestions as to how we 
might, in the words of Spike Lee, "do the right thing." 
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overview and conceptual introduction to feminism that, in spite of its brevity, is 
remarkably comprehensive. Moreover, the essay combines the quality of being 
very accessible to those who are unfamiliar with feminism with cogent and clearly 
developed criticisms of feminist arguments with which Smart disagrees. Particularly 
helpful is her abandonment of the traditional categorizations of feminism, with 
the polarization these have often implied, and Smart's tentative development of a 
new conceptualization around the following approaches: master theory; 
experiential/epistemological; psychological/modes of reasoning; and social justice/ 
harm. 
But the essay is not without its problems. For· example, Smart posits that 
Catharine MacKinnon 's jurisprudence is "not concerned with concepts of equality 
or fairness" (p. 141 ). The latter perhaps not, but the concept of equality is pivotal 
to Mac Kinnon' s argument. Also, I have concerns about the polarized way in 
which Smart constructs the feminist engagement with jurisprudence: "it has 
become clear that what is required is either a radical transformation or an 
abandonment of jurisprudence altogether" (p. 133). There is no indication of mere 
supplementation here. It's all or nothing. How.ever much I might want to agree 
with Smart's ambitions, I think that in the current historico-political conjuncture a 
"radical transformation" in the foreseeable future is unlikely, but that 
"reconstructive deviationism"12 is potentially feasible. The resort to the dualistic 
either/or may foreclose too many options that feminists may wish "perhaps even 
need " to pursue. 
Moreover, it is still not clear to me what is to be the nature of the "radical 
transformation" that Smart calls for. Specifically, I found it quite challenging to 
figure out Smart's own position in relation to each of the subcomponents of her 
reconceptualization of feminist jurisprudence. After her criticisms, it was difficult 
to know what she had abandoned and what she had retained. For example, at 
times, she seems to indicate that there may be some "agreed feminist principles" 
(p. 156) "though they remain unspecified" and yet simultaneously, she suggests 
that these might be impossible given the profound differences between women on 
the basis of their race, class and context This sensitivity to the key differences 
between women, in tum, leads Smart to suggest that perhaps law and jurisprudence 
are part of the problem of domination and that the quest for feminist jurisprudence 
is mistaken because it retains law as a central focus. My response to this is 
twofold. First, in relation to every social practice that feminists confront there are 
likely to be profound conflicts.13 This however, cannot be a reason for abdication, 
elsewise there would be no location for feminist activism. Second, while we 
12. See more generally, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). For a suggestion of the utility of deviationism to feminism, see 
my "On the Road to Radical Reform" (1989) 29 Osgoode Hall L. J. at 641. 
13. See, for example, Marilyn Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., Conflicts in Feminism 
(New York: Routledge, 1990). 
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should be careful not to fetishize law, it would equally be a mistake to abandon it 
because, as the essays by Goodrich and Hachamovitch and Carty demonstrate, 
law is both symbolically real and everywhere. The trick is to know when to resist, 
when to ignore and when to renew law. One task of progressive legal theory is to 
help us make those necessarily local and strategic choices. 
Now the contributors, or at least some of them, may wish to resist my request 
for paying greater attention to the development of . strategies of renewal. They 
might want to argue that such a plea domesticates and deradicalizes the 
fundamentally challenging insights that postmodemism and deconstruction pose 
for both law and jurisprudence. They might suggest that my desire for reconstructive 
insights is born of the hubris of the jurisprudential discipline which seeks to 
translate and thereby subordinate and co-opt all other disciplines to its agenda. 
Fitzpatrick raises this concern (but does not fully develop it)14 in the opening 
paragraph of his essay, when he quotes Twining's concern that "the essential 
nature of the process is for someone to venture forth from the intellectual milieu 
of the law and to come back with spoils from elsewhere and to present them in 
assimilable form" (p. 1 ). 
This is a legitimate and cautionary concern, but it seems to me that the question 
of "what is to be done" is not primarily a jurisprudential question. Rather, it is an 
ethico-political one, and the answer might be, as Carol Smart points out in her 
book Feminism and the Power of Law15 but not so clearly in her essay, that in 
certain contexts you may wish to use law and jurisprudence, while in other 
circumstances you may not. Thus, the proposition that greater emphasis needs to 
be focused upon what those who are progressive might do after the decoding does 
not necessarily imply that legal agendas are essential. Nonetheless, we must not 
forget that law plays an extremely important constitutive role in the interplay of 
contemporary social relations, and in the same way as it did not "wither away" in 
pseudo-marxist societies, I doubt if it will "wither away" just because it can be 
deconstructed. Moreover, I believe that there is a real danger in being too deferential 
to postmodern thought, because to do so may, paradoxically, result in installing it 
as a new "master narrative," unresponsive and unaccountable. By inquiring as to 
what postmodernism may have to offer in facilitating the creation of alternative, 
radically heterodox, socio-political alternatives "in which I believe law will be at 
least a part," a double purpose is reserved: first, postmodernism's own potential 
for self-indulgence is destabilized; and second, we might just find that it does 
have something to contribute.16 At the very minimum, there is no harm in asking. 
14. For a much more elaborate version see Pierre Schlag "Le Hors de Texte C'est Moi" 
(1990) 11 Cardozo L.R. at 1631 .  
15. London: Routledge, 1989. 
16. For examples of several efforts within literary criticism which pursue such an approach 
(though not always successfully) see Jonathan Arac, ed., Postmodernism and Politics 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: 
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The problem with Dangerous Supplements is that despite its subtitle-Resistance 
and R�newal in Jurisprudence-in the main, it does not ask such questions. As a 
result, the title promises more than the book produces. Despite the fact that the 
essays are dangerous in that they do much to challenge the dominance of the neo­
positivist mindframe of so much contemporary jurisprudence, for my taste they 
are not dangerous enough. because insufficient attention is paid to renewal. 
An/nJroduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); FredericJ ameson. 
The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Art (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981 ); and Frank Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983). 
224 
